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“Virtue or Will” Two Notions of Freedom in the 
Concept of Arendtian Politics*
Stefanie Rosenmüller
Yet just as we, despite all theories and isms, still believe 
that to say ‘Freedom is the raison d’être of politics’ is no 
more than a truism”1
Introduction
“The meaning of politics is freedom”2 This is the famous yet somewhat opaque definition 
of freedom in Hannah Arendt’s fragmentary Introduction into politics. This obviously 
special relation between politics and freedom will be explored in this article.
Clearly, plenty of difficulties lurk behind the establishment of a clear-cut definition of 
Arendt’s concept of freedom, since Arendt evolves her concepts in a metaphorical 
language. Her description of current political phenomena refers to long buried notions 
that she attempts to resurrect.  Frequently, Arendt raises these extinct references by 
excavating their etymology, often by contrasting them to common ambiguities and 
misinterpretations that explain this extinction of these archaic concepts. Thus Arendt 
indirectly ties together political and terminological history; it is for this reason that recent 
scholarship has rekindled interest in Arendt’s work.
In the essay “What Is Freedom?” (1958) Arendt develops her concept of political 
freedom as freedom in an exceptional sense. Arendt defines the concept of political 
freedom mainly by contrasting it to several other notions of freedom - above all, to that of 
free will, which has played a dominant role in the Christian tradition. The notion of free 
will has traditionally dominated the understanding of politics, however it has done so by 
misinterpreting freedom as independence and sovereignty. 
To find out what Hannah Arendt’s antipodal concept of political freedom is, I would like 
to pick up on two threads of contention which were raised in the workshop on “Violence 
and Politics”3 in the work of Arendt.
*  I am grateful to Alison Borrowman for helping with the translation.
1  In: What Is Freedom?, in: Arendt, Hannah: Between Past and Future; Eight Exercises in Political Thought, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977, pp. 143 – 171, p. 156 (henceforth: WF). This text is a shortened translation of 
the German language publication: Freiheit und Politik (1958). In the English edition the fifth part of the text 
is missing. I therefore sometimes refer to the German text, quoted as: Arendt, Hannah: Freiheit und Politik 
(henceforth: FuP) in: Zwischen Vergangenheit und Zukunft (henceforth: ZVuZ), Übungen im politischen 
Denken I, Piper München 20002; pp. 201 - 226.
2  Hannah Arendt: Introduction into politics, in: Arendt, Hannah: The Promise of Politics, edited by Jerome 
Kohn, Schocken Books, New York, 2005, p. 108, which is based on the German fragments of Arendt´s 
Einführung in die Politik, edited by Ursula Ludz, titled Hannah Arendt: Was ist Politik? Piper, 2003. 
(henceforth: IP).
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I. Interruption and Initium
1. We can think about Foucault’s concept of power as analogous to the Arendtian concept 
of the machinery of the social4. This machinery of the social falls under Arendt’s category 
of labor, one of the three basic forms of activities, ‘labor’, ‘work’, and ‘action’, which she 
elaborates in The Human Condition5. Under this analogy we can interpret Arendt’s essay 
On Violence (1970)6 as an attempt to conceptualize political freedom as the capacity to 
interrupt the automatisms of the category of labor. 
In On Violence Arendt draws attention to the great temptation to stop or interrupt 
these automatisms by means of violence. A violent act triggers a new chain of events - but 
this chain of causes and effects differs greatly, as Arendt points out, from the sequence of 
events initiated by politically free beginnings that she would call ‘action’. Thus Arendt 
insists on the distinction between two different kinds of interruptions of automatic 
processes that are easily confounded.
For a definition of the difference between these two types of interruptions, we draw on 
the two notions of ‘beginning’ that Arendt introduces in The Human Condition, referring 
to St. Augustine’s notions of ‘principium’ versus ‘initium’7. A principium - a cause - 
launches a new beginning for a chain of causes and effects. However, the initium, in 
Augustine’s somewhat enigmatic definition, is related to “the character of human 
existence in the world”8. In Arendt’s interpretation this type of beginning differs from the 
beginning in the sense of ‘principium’ that refers to God’s creation of the world. “Man is 
free because he is a beginning and was so created after the universe had already come into 
existence”9.
Arendt goes on to provide some hints to understanding the difference between initium 
and principium. Initium means “the freedom to call something into being which did not 
exist before, which was not given, not even as an object of cognition or imagination, and 
which therefore, strictly speaking, could not be known.”10.
3  This paper was initiated by a Workshop of Dr. Vlasta Jalusic and PD Dr. Wolfgang Heuer (Violence And 
Politics: The Challenges Of Our Time. Reading Hannah Arendt. Peace Institute/Workers’ and Punks’ 
University, Ljubljana, Slovenia, September 17 -27, 2004), as a close reading of WF. The following 
considerations are continued in my PhD on: Locating Justice/Der Ort des Rechts bei Hannah Arendt 
(Universität Flensburg), forthcoming 2008. 
4  I am grateful to Vlasta Jalusic for this hint. For further connections between Foucault and Arendt see e.g. 
Amy Allen: Power, Subjectivity and Agency: Between Arendt and Foucault, International Journal of  
Philosophical Studies, Vol. 10 (2),. 2002, pp. 131 – 149. 
5  See chapters III (labor), IV (work) and V (action) in Arendt, Hannah: The Human Condition, University of 
Chicago Press, 1958 (henceforth: HC).
6  Arendt, Hannah: On Violence. In: Crisis of the Republic: Lying in Politics - Civil Disobedience - On Violence - 
Thoughts on Politics and Revolution, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973, pp. 103 - 198 (henceforth: OV). 
7  „According to Augustine, the two were so different that he used a different word to indicate the beginning 
which is man (initium), designating the beginning of the world by principium, which is the standard 
translation for the first Bible verse. As can be seen from De civitate Dei XI 32, the word principium carried for 
Augustine a much less radical meaning: the beginning of the world does not mean that nothing was made 
before (for the angels were), whereas he adds explicitly (...) with reference to man that nobody was before 
him.“, HC, p. 350, note 3.
8  WF, p. 167.
9  WF, p. 167.
10  WF, p. 151.
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Arendt adds that according to Augustine the word principium carried “a much less radical 
meaning: the beginning of the world does not mean that nothing was made before (for the 
angels were), whereas he adds explicitly (...) with reference to man that nobody was 
before him”11. 
2. Can we apply this distinction to the distinction between violent acts and free political 
beginnings?
If we understand violence in the Arendtian sense of a strictly instrumental category 12 we 
can say that the beginning of a violent act is planned as the first step in a strategy, with 
which one uses certain means to reach a certain goal or purpose. This interpretation 
conforms with the category of ‘work’ in the analysis of activities in Arendt’s The Human 
Condition, mentioned above. Being planned, the idea of the goal and perhaps the means 
to reach it as well are already “known” and “given” in the sense of the Arendtian definition 
above. However, Arendt suggests that a political beginning need not be planned, but can 
merely be something not fully known or recognized by the actor himself13. This is the first 
difference between political acting that takes place in the public realm and is related to 
human beings, and instrumental working that occurs within the world of objects, as 
Arendt points out in The Human Condition. The second difference relates to the 
consequences. While instrumental activities i.e. ‘work’ in the terminology of Arendt, have 
a distinct result and end, ‘acting’ is unforeseeable in terms of it’s consequences. In 
FuP/WF Arendt stresses this point when she says that ‘action’, “seen from the perspective 
(…) of the process in whose framework it occurs and whose automatisms it interrupts, is a 
‘miracle’ – that is something which could not be expected”14. This is because “from the 
viewpoint of the processes in the universe and in nature, and their statistically 
overwhelming probabilities, the coming into being of the earth (...) and (...), the evolution 
of man, finally out of the processes of organic life are all ‘infinite improbabilities’, they are 
‘miracles’ in everyday language”15.
Now we understand that there are two steps in Arendt’s argumentation in On Violence. 
Violent acts are meant to interrupt the social automatisms under the category of labor. 
But violent acts fall under the category of work. Their beginning may be free but only 
insofar as they are controlled by the actor as their creator. He decides to put out an 
impulse to start a chain of causes and effects. The creator chooses one of a given set of  
possibilities. And thus the violent act interrupts the automatic process only to start a 
chain or circle of violence that is just as inevitable; one predetermined process of events is 
transformed into another predetermined chain of events. It follows that the interruption 
is not a real interruption. This kind of beginning does not free the creator from 
automatisms; it simply leads to another form of predetermination.
11  Of course this sounds contradictory, if something did already exist before the existence of human beings, 
then that is, „not nothing“(HC, p. 350, note 3). But the meaning can be understood by noting the distinction 
between „nothing“ and „nobody“. One could supplement it: Before the existence of mankind there existed 
something but not somebody. Being somebody corresponds to Arendt‘s definition of human individuality and 
describes particularly the attributed faculty to start initiatives. Hence this explanation is not contradictory but 
only tautological.
12  See OV.
13  WF, p. 144.
14  WF, p. 169.
15  WF, p. 169 f.
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But it then follows that the instrumental, i.e., violent beginning, is not even strictly free, in 
the sense of the indeterminateness that Arendt wants to preserve. “The power to 
command, to dictate action, is not a matter of freedom but a question of strength or 
weakness”16. In general we can now say that for Arendt the category of cause and effect 
does not apply in politics and should to be reserved for the sphere of objects 17.
3. Subsequently Arendt links this thought with a critique of the political concept of 
sovereignty. There again is a clear analogy to Foucault, who also declines to understand 
power as a form of justified violence or sovereignty as a political principle18. The reason 
behind this critique may be the same for both, as sovereignty leads to a legitimacy of 
violence. Arendt, at least, argues that the category of cause and effect always presupposes 
a sovereignty which is typical for homo faber i.e. man as the working being; not for the 
actor, man as a political being19. For unlike homo faber, man as the political actor is never 
master and sovereign of his actions20. Therefore for Arendt, sovereignty is not a political 
category and its use in politics has a rotting or spoiling effect21. First, in the view of 
Arendt, the confusion of these two categories causes a misinterpretation of freedom as 
independence, while dependence on others is then perceived as a constraint. But since 
politics is the space where people rely on others, freedom becomes something which is to 
be excluded from the political sphere22; freedom means then a freedom “from” politics23. 
This must seem absurd to Arendt, who uses freedom in its antique concept, which framed 
freedom as a radically political concept24: it exists only within the political sphere and 
hence can succeed or fail only there. But the confusion is not only a problem of theory. 
According to Arendt it also has a practical effect, because it destroys freedom itself 25. 
Sovereignty and freedom are antagonistic concepts26: that means, in Arendt’s concept, 
“Non-sovereignty” seems to be the prerequisite for freedom and not vice versa.
Arendt draws the connection between homo faber and sovereignty when she quotes 
Carl Schmitt: “He recognizes clearly that the root of sovereignty is the will: sovereign is 
who wills and commands”27. One can suggest that the identification of freedom and 
sovereignty leads, in Arendt’s view, to an understanding of politics as a battlefield. “For it 
16  WF, p. 152. Note: There appears to be a systematic irregularity here, because strength in Arendt’s terms 
refers to nature and labor, while freedom of the will refers to work. One possible explanation of this lies in the 
fact that nature was interpreted in a different way during and beyond the renaissance - the dawn of the 
mechanical age - than it is today. Today, according to Arendt in HC, all the activities have shifted, and to 
some extend exchanged places so that they no longer fit and have a destructive effect: mankind “acts” in the 
realm of nature instead of the public realm and causes unpredictable consequences; whereas man 
understands himself mainly as an animal laborans. In any case, command has nothing to do with freedom.
17  See also (in German): Kultur und Politik, 1958, in: ZVuZ, pp. 277 - 304, p. 294 ff (henceforth: KuP). In 
English: The Crisis in Culture, in: Between Past and Future, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1977, pp. 277 - 226.
18  See esp. Chapter 2 in: Foucault, Michel: Society must be defended, New York, Picador, 2003. I am grateful to 
Bernd Heiter for this reference.
19  In German: “setzt Souveränität voraus, die der Herstellende, aber nie der Handelnde besitzt”, KuP, p. 295.
20 In German: „homo faber ist Herr und Meister: der Handelnde ist aber nie Souverän”, KuP, p. 295.
21   “verderblich”, FuP, p. 213.
22  FuP, p. 225.
23  Also see Arendt’s remarks on „Freiheit von“ in: Revolution und Freiheit, 1953, in: ZVuZ, pp. 305 - 326, p. 
241, (henceforth: RuF).
24  See FuP, p. 211.
25  “Fatal consequences”, WF, p. 162.
26 „Freedom and sovereignty are so little identical that they cannot even exist simultaneously.“ WF, p. 164.
See also in FuP, p. 214, the reduction of variety to the singular. In Arendt’s writings solitude is always an 
attribute of homo faber and non-freedom.
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leads either to a denial of freedom (...) or to the insight that the freedom of one man, or a 
group, or a body politic can be purchased only at the price of the freedom, i.e. the 
sovereignty of all others.”28 On the contrary, Arendt states, “if men wish to be free, it is 
precisely sovereignty they must renounce”29. We see now that homo faber as the sovereign 
of his work is connected with this quotation of Schmitt to the freedom of the will. 
Arendt defines, with Augustine, freedom of the will as “liberum arbitrium”, i.e., “a 
freedom of choice that arbitrates and decides between two given things, one good and one 
evil, and whose choice is predetermined by motive which has only to be argued to start its 
operation”30.
Now we have a systematically clear opposition between instrumental work, which is a 
relationship of violence started by a principium that refers to goals that can be chosen and 
is thus ruled by motives and a free will and political action with a free beginning in the 
sense of initium. But the contents of this opposition have still not been illuminated. 
What is Arendt’s counter-concept? What is freedom in Arendt’s concept then, if it is not 
the freedom of the will?II. Will and Virtue
In WF Arendt does not give a clear cut definition of political freedom, but she does give 
certain hints within the contrasting systematic of work, labor, and action that can help us 
to approximate her concept of political freedom. 
Arendt states: “Action, to be free, must be free from motive on one side, from its 
intended goal as a predictable effect on the other. This is not to say that motives and aims 
are not important factors in every single act, but they are its determining factors, and 
action is free to the extent that it is able to transcend them.”31 This again is a definition 
which frames political freedom in opposition to the category of instrumental work. 
Moreover, this freedom does not seem to be defined by the existence or absence of certain 
given circumstances but rather in terms of the actor’s relationship towards his own 
motives, i.e., to himself. To follow Arendt’s argumentation and to understand the way in 
which the actor can be “free” from his own motives, let us again draw the parallel to 
Foucault. In his late thinking Foucault proposes self-care as a proper ethical relationship 
to oneself32. This self-care must therefore be of a different structure than the power of the 
social, which dominates us. So perhaps we can draw an analogy to Arendt’s concept of 
virtue as a proper ethical relationship to oneself and to others, while she does not call it 
self-care, but ‘self-control’33.
27  Note No. 5 , p. 40, in FuP-2, i.e.: Freedom and Politics: a Lecture, in: Chicago Review 14, Heft 1 Spring 1960, 
p. 28 - 46, quoted by the editor Ursula Ludz of ZVuZ on p. 411. But sovereignty and violence might be an 
adequate concept for the sphere of law, especially for constitutional law; see Arendt’s remarks on 
Montesquieu in FuP, p. 215 and the end of this article.
28 WF, p. 164.
29 WF, p. 165.
30 WF, p. 151.
31  WF, p. 151.
32  See Foucault, Michel: L’éthique du souci de soi comme pratique de la liberté, in: Concordia. Revista 
international de filosofia, No. 6, 1984, pp. 99 – 116.
33  WF, p. 159 , “Selbstbeherrschung” in FuP, p. 212.
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1. How does Arendt describe virtue?
In WF Arendt explains her notion of the freedom that is inherent in political acting by 
recalling Machiavelli’s concept of ‘virtu’, which in her words is: “the excellence with which 
man answers the opportunities the world opens up before him in the guise of fortuna”34. 
Arendt then provides three characteristics which are connected with one’s relations to 
others: virtue is a kind of “virtuosity”, that is, an “excellence”35, it needs an audience as “a 
space where freedom can appear”36, and it needs “courage”37. Due to the similarities that 
political “virtuosity” may have with creative arts38, Arendt now has to define these aspects 
in their specifically political sense. Courage is political, Arendt argues, in so far that one is 
not occupied with matters of individual survival and providing for oneself but has to 
confront considerations of public interest. “Courage is indispensable because in politics 
not life but the world is at stake”39. That implies the ability to direct one’s interest to 
public matters and calls for the courage to disengage from the cares of daily survival and 
perhaps even to risk life itself40 - this at least is a clear analogy to Foucault’s attempt to 
conceptualize individual courage as the quality required to take the risk of adhering to an 
opinion that deviates from that of a despot41. Arendt might also be hinting that in politics 
it takes courage to confront the public’s judgment of our deeds and speeches. 
Arendt’s specific definition of the political, which separates surviving, i.e., in her terms, 
social questions, off from political matters, is highly controversial42, at least in its 
relevance and applicability for modern times. We can concede, though, that two focuses 
can be discerned: the focus on public and communicative matters and that on matters of 
survival.
Thus virtue which Arendt herself compares with the Aristotelian notion of ethical 
virtue, the areté43, is a habitus that, in terms of its relation to others, is again in 
juxtaposition to instrumental relationships and to relations of the social, of nature and the 
category of labor. Unlike labor and nature-related activities, virtue requires a public space 
and has its goal within the performance, not in the result, as it is the case with work and 
the instrumental or cultural activities of techné and poiesis. I have already mentioned 
above the difference between the actor’s initiative in action and homo faber’s beginning of 
a work and alluded to the difference in the activities’ focus. With regard to the sense of 
freedom, we can now sum up in terms of what is absent, i.e., as a negative freedom, 
freedom from cares of survival and freedom from criteria of utility.
34  WF, p. 153.
35  “An excellence, we attribute to the performing arts, as distinguished from the creative arts of making, where 
the accomplishment lies in the performance itself”, WF, p. 153.
36  WF, p. 154.
37  WF, p. 156, 
38 Both politics and culture, which in Arendt’s diction is identical with art, share the public realm. See KuP, part 
II.
39  WF, p. 156. See also: “For politics, according to the same philosophy must be concerned almost exclusively 
with the maintenance of life and the safeguarding of its interests”, WF, p. 155.
40 See IP, p. 122.
41  See Foucault, Michel: Fearless Speech, New York, Semiotext(e) 2001. I am grateful to Bernd Heiter for this 
reference.
42  See e.g. Bernstein, Richard: Rethinking the Social and the Political in: Philosophical Profiles, Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 1986, pp 238 - 259.
43  „Areté” in FuP, p. 206, only implicit in WF, p. 153.
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Now let us see whether we can consider this difference as a difference in the relation of 
man towards himself.
2. This excellence mentioned above is the ‘telos’ that can be fulfilled in political action. 
The way this type of telos leads the political action, shows us what sort of freedom is at 
issue44. To distinguish it from purposes and motives, Arendt calls it “a principle”45. 
Although this term sounds similar to the Augustianian term of “principium” mentioned 
above, there is no similarity in the notions themselves46. Some elements can be found to 
help us to characterize this type of principle as a telos. Arendt describes it in the central 
passage:
“Principles do not operate from within the self as motives do - “mine own deformity” or 
“my fair proportion” - but inspire, as it were, from without; and they are much too general 
to prescribe particular goals, although every particular aim can be judged in the light of its 
principle once the act has been started. For, unlike the judgment of the intellect, which 
precedes action, and unlike the command of the will which initiates it, the inspiring 
principle becomes fully manifest only in the performing act itself, yet while the merits of 
judgments loose their validity, and the strength of the commanding will exhausts itself, in 
the course of the act which they execute in cooperation, the principle which inspired it 
loses nothing in strength or validity through execution. In distinction from its goal, the 
principle of an action can be repeated time and again, it is inexhaustible, and in 
distinction from its motive, the validity of a principle is universal, it is not bound to any 
particular person or to any particular group. (...) Such principles are honor or glory, love 
of equality, which Montesquieu called virtue, or distinction or excellence (...) but also fear 
or distrust or hatred. Freedom or its opposite appears in the world whenever such 
principles are actualized; the appearance of freedom, like the manifestation of principles, 
coincides with the performing act. Men are free - as distinguished from their possessing 
the gift for freedom - as long as they act, neither before nor after, for to be free and to act 
are the same.”47
The differentiation between this telos, as a principle which liberates from survival, and 
utilitarian aspects leads us to the conclusion that these are activities that need not be 
carried out in opposition to others. Whereas firstly work is led by an idea, strictly 
governed by motives, and leads, at least in general, to predictable consequences, action, in 
the sense of the areté, is, as Arendt says, “inspired” but not “prescribed” by the principle 48. 
This lends a quality of an open future, of un-determination then, to the notion of freedom. 
One can adhere to the principles of an action even though impulses may lead to effects 
other than what was planned. Virtuosity, thus, involves the ability to enter into and react 
44 Arendt’s difference between telos as model and product in technical activities and telos as principle in 
political activities is very close to the Aristotelian difference between techné and praxis in the NE, Book I.
45  “Action insofar as it is free is neither under the guidance of the intellect nor under the dictate of will - (...) - 
but springs from something altogether different which (following Montesquieu’s famous analysis of 
government) I shall call a principle.”, WF, p. 152.
46 We saw that on the contrary, principium is contrasted to initium. Now the principle is one of - political - 
action and must therefore be connected to the term initium.
47  WF, p. 152 f.
48 WF, p. 152.
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adequately to the actions of the others and to the unpredictable effects of one’s own 
actions49.
The manifestation of an action, lies therefore in the performance itself and, as Arendt 
adds, the principle is not “exhausted”. This expression sounds somewhat odd. Arendt 
probably means that unlike with technical purposes, there is no need to find a new goal 
after having acted appropriately. The telos has been fulfilled, but cannot be grasped like a 
technical product can. There is no necessity to perform some defined completing step, 
rather new steps and paths can always be employed or invented. This aspect, of course, 
also emphasizes the notion of freedom in the sense of un-determination.
Moreover, the telos “transcends”50 the individual purpose. “They do not operate within 
the self as motivation”51 , “but from without”, from outside the self, we are left to complete 
this sentence on our own. It is not easy to reformulate this universality of the principle as 
a “freedom from” individual interests, because the notion “universality” usually describes 
a non-relative validity (one independent of persons or cultures) which  implies a stronger 
moral tie rather than a release. But of course, it articulates a disengagement from 
personal motives and particular interests within the public space52.
Arendt observes that the manifestation of the principle does not depend on the 
circumstances, which are measured by judgment, nor does it depend on the purposes, 
stated by reason and will. This underlines again her distinction between the initiative 
aspects of action and the executive elements of an activity, in which will and reason 
cooperate, and which fall under Arendt’s category of work53.
At this point, it is still not clear whether freedom itself is a principle or a habitus (a 
hexis), like a virtue, to follow the right “or the opposite” principles, but it seems to be the 
latter: “Freedom appears where the principles are actualized.”
We commonly assume that freedom means the possibility to realize something. That 
would be a positive definition of freedom. But for the realization, that Arendt is referring 
to, failure does not seem to be at issue. Perhaps it is realized already simply by bearing the 
right principles in mind. But don’t they have to be manifested somehow, if not in a result? 
They may be realized in an Aristotelian way, by choosing “the middle way”, the mesotes, 
between two polarities. But wouldn’t this come too close to what Arendt calls freedom of 
choice between two possibilities, which is freedom of the will?
Goals such as glory, equality, excellence and honor might guide an action and only be 
apparent in a stylistic way. If we distinguish, with Aristoteles, between individual 
activities  and a learnt, rehearsed, more permanent habitus, then we need not interpret 
the middle way as some kind of arithmetical mean of a given collection of possible 
actions. After all, that would be no more than a quantified scale that would calculate what 
was “best for”, or “worst for” according to a goal-means equation. Instead, the hexis of the 
mesotes refers to an intermediate, moderate attitute towards passions which helps one to 
49 I am grateful to Wolfgang Heuer for this reference.
50 This cannot be an end in a utilitarian sense, as the principle is independent of other purposes.
51  WF, p. 151.
52  See the „freedom from“, i.e., abstraction and avoidance, of politics. See FuP, p. 216.
53  This opens another systematic problem in HC. Arendt’s systematic of the ideal activities does not suggest 
that they appear „purely“ in modern times. In many cases there will occur a mixture of elements of the given 
idealized activities. But even then it is not clear if action and work can be strictly divided.
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bind oneself to the ethically good principles54. So we can confirm that there is a 
conceptual difference to the freedom of will.
But if “excellence” is one of the principles and freedom is also excellence, as we saw 
above, then the virtue freedom is also the principle freedom. It appears now that telos and 
habitus are mixed up in this passage. 
A second slight shift of meaning occurs in this passage of the text, when Arendt 
explains the sense in which “freedom is inherent in action”55. Arendt first gives a 
definition in which freedom is one possible form of action. “Action insofar as it is free” 56 is 
contrasted to “action insofar as it is determined”57. Later Arendt defines freedom and 
action as identical: “Men are free when they act...for to be free and to act are the same” 58. 
So it is not clear whether action is a descriptive term with two possible manifestations - 
free and non-free - or a normative term - action deserves to be called action only, when it 
appears in its free form59. This difficulty is general and is due to Arendt’s 
phenomenological method, which she does not explore explicitly60.
3. Arendt juxtaposes the antique conflict between the two faculties of reason and 
passion61 with another conflict within the will which appeared with Christianity. „What 
was unknown to antiquity was not that there is such a thing as I-know-but-I-will-not, but 
that I will and I-can are not the same - non hoc est velle, quod posse.“62 To understand the 
difference between these two conflicts as more as a gradual difference, we should take 
into account the greek metaphor of the taming of the steeds of the soul that Arendt 
quotes63.
The taming of the steeds portrays the conflict between the passions and reason within 
the soul. In Plato’s allegory of the chariot of the personality in the Phaidros dialog64 two 
different horses are described: one is able to understand and obey words and logos 65 and 
the other is not. While the horses according to Arendt, give the „motion“66, the reason, 
logos, sets the direction. Logos has to „attune“ the power of the two steeds, so that they 
„coincide“, where otherwise they might pull in different directions67.
We can also envision the Christian model of the will as chariot, but of a different kind, 
because this time, as Arendt says, the good will “commands“68. In the allegory of the 
chariot we can describe this as the leading will that represses the horses of the natural 
54  See Wolf, Ursula: Aristoteles‘ Nikomachische Ethik, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Darmstadt, 2002, 
p. 158 f.
55  WF, p. 153.
56  „It springs from a principle“, WF, p. 152. 
57  ..„Is guided by a future aim”, WF, p. 151, which refers to the work category.
58  WF, p. 153.
59  This leads again to the systematic problems of HC to divide work and action; resp. to the question, how the 
ideal activities appear in their empirical form.
60 However, I would suggest that the first chapter about „Appearence“ in „The Life of the Mind“ can be read as a 
methodical introduction into her work. See Arendt, Hannah: The Life of the Mind, Vol. One: Thinking, 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., New York, London, 1977.
61  WF, p. 158.
62  WF, p. 158 with reference to Augustine: Confessiones, book VII, ch.9.
63  WF, p. 161.
64 Phaidros 246 b.
65  Phaidros 253 c.
66 WF, p. 158.
67  WF, p. 159.
68 Arendt quotes Paulus in WF, p. 161.
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will. In this model there are also two competing powers, but this time one, that is giving 
the motion, is sitting on the wagon, one standing in front of it. So, they weaken each 
other. “The two-in one of solitude (...) has the exactly opposite effect on the will: it 
paralyses and locks it within itself; willing in solitude is always velle and nolle, to will and 
not to will at the same time“69. Thus, will itself is “broken”70. 
In Greece, the conflict between reason and the horses of passion may take this form: 
reason knows what is best, but passion, tymos, does not want to follow. Arendt points out 
that in the intellectual tradition of Socrates’ concept, in which virtue is a kind of 
knowledge, this problem is resolved because reason is stronger in the long run than the 
passions. Once reason has understood and seen beyond the blinding glare of the passions, 
they seem to fade away: „there is no passion left to prevent man from doing what he 
knows is right.“71 
Interestingly, all these conflicts are conceived as conflicts with outer circumstances: “all 
these factors, the psychological ones not excluded, condition the person from the 
outside“72. Therefore the art of freedom consists of the virtuosity in skillfully liberating 
oneself from these necessities. We can even transfer this kind of pressure of necessity to 
modern days as compulsion to consume, that we have to free ourselves from, in order to 
find out what our real interests are. Alternatively, we portray the conflict as a battle 
between good will and passions. This Christian model of the will is reflexive: the will 
commands the self, not the outer world, the self is therefore the place of the conflict, not a 
struggle between the ego and external obstacles.
Can we now answer the question of whether political freedom in Arendt‘s concept of 
virtue can be viewed as a good relationship towards oneself - with a directing principle 
that inspires, but does not compel, as the governing purpose?   
Although it may be indispensable for Foucault to presuppose a constitutional notion of 
intersubjectivity for his concept of self-care73, Arendt’s refusal to see virtue as a 
relationship towards the self is too strong to support this analogy.
On the contrary, her critique rests on the claim that the reflective shift to a freedom of 
the will goes hand in hand with the fall of the political. While both Foucault and Arendt 
are searching for interruptions, resistant correctives of the automatisms of the social, 
Foucault constructs them as singular elements while Arendt vehemently denies that 
solitude can be a political source and she conceptualizes resistant impulses only within a 
network.
4. One problematic aspect lies in the fact that within Arendt’s systematics political 
freedom constantly presupposes mastery of the private. „Only those could begin 
something new who were already rulers (i.e. household heads who ruled over slaves and 
family)“74. This leads to a contradiction in Arendt’s argumentation. On the one hand 
69 WF, p. 158.
70  „A will which is broken in itself“, WF, p. 159.
71 WF, p. 159.
72  WF, p. 160.
73  See Bernd Heiter in: „Intersubjektivität und die „Sorge um sich“. Kommentierende Bemerkungen zu 
Foucaults interpretativer Analytik der antiken Ethik, pp. 52 - 67, Nachworte zu: Foucault, Michel: Das 
Wahrsprechen des Anderen: 2 Vorlesungen von 1983/84, hrsg. v. Ulrike Reuter u. a., Materialis Frankfurt 
(Main), 1988, p. 63. 
74  WF, p. 166; in German:„Anfangen kann nur dem zufallen, der Herrscher bereits ist“, FuP, p. 218.
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sovereignty is rejected as principle in politics and is connected to freedom of will, which, 
as I have tried to show, can be assigned to the instrumental sphere of work. But on the 
other hand, Arendt does not miss a chance to underline that being a sovereign and master 
of the household is the starting point for the Greeks to enter the political sphere and play 
their role as „archontes“, rulers, beginners and leaders75, giving initiatives within politics. 
Thus being master in both directions, controlling and governing a house as pater familias 
and controlling oneself in „taming the steeds“ is indispensable for being virtuous in the 
public sphere, where „they no longer ruled but were rulers among rulers“76.
This is due to the hierarchy of the activities in HC. Work is fundamental for action; it 
gives the framework, establishes and defends the polis like the „walls of the polis“, where 
the political debates and vigour can take place, as if on a stage. 
How, then, can Arendt claim that her notion of politics differs considerably from that 
one of Carl Schmitt? Are politics, in Arendt’s systematics, not just as dependant on 
sovereignty? We can use Arendt’s own example of the archontes and patres familias to 
demonstrate this dependency: in the absence of sovereignty, one cannot avoid having to 
fight for it, either in the case of individuals or of groups, sovereignty must be obtained to 
regain or establish a foundation for the political realm and free debate. It sounds then 
nearly cynical to insist on the statement that politics should be free from sovereignty. 
Politics are portrayed as a purified sphere, but only through relegating their problematical 
aspects into the nonpolitical arena of violent struggles. The separation of instrumental 
violence and the free sphere of the political would then be a merely rhetorical means of 
purifying politics from its seamy side.
One argument in favor of Arendt would be that violence itself, in her systematic 
framework, is in turn grounded on power and authority and loses its strength when 
approval, at least tacit consent, is withheld77. The other justification is that, Arendt does 
go on to insist, as no more than this, that the instrumental category of work must be 
interpreted as functional for politics, while its tendency to dominate and usurp politics, 
which leads to an erasure of the political realm, must be viewed critiqually. She stresses 
the point that although action requires work, as politics encompasses violence and 
strategy, the former must not be reduced to or confused with the latter. Thus the 
systematical difference between work and action might culminate in two other notions of 
freedom which Arendt contrasts in IP: Courage, as we saw above „liberates“ from matters 
of survival. But this is only the first step. The positive freedom that Arendt links to 
virtuosity describes how people realize actions in the public sphere. In IP Arendt states in 
a positivist’s manner78, that humans must be „liberated“, before being able to be free; thus 
she distinguishes between „liberation“ which is a purpose that can be achieved by a given 
means and „freedom“ that exists beyond the technical sphere. How can these two aspects 
75  WF, p. 166.
76  WF, p. 166.
77  See OV, p. 144.
78  „Man must first be liberated or liberate himself in order to enjoy freedom, and being liberated from 
domination by life’s necessities was the true meaning of the Greek word scholé or the Latin otium – what we 
today call leisure. This liberation, in contrast to freedom, was an end that could, and had to, be achieved by 
certain means. This crucial means was slavery, the brute force by which one man compelled others to relieve 
him of the cares of daily life. (...) But this rule itself was not political, although it was an indispensable 
prerequisite of all things political“. IP, p. 116 f. 
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of freedom - the negative freedom of not being ruled and the positive freedom of not 
ruling - be conceptualized other than by making violence a necessary but not sufficient 
pre-requisite for positive freedom? These are the lines to be followed79 for a further 
exposition of Arendt‘s concept of political freedom.
79  „’Politics’, in the Greek sense of the word, is therefore centered around freedom, whereby freedom is 
understood negatively as not being ruled or ruling, and positively as a space which can be created only by 
men and in which each man moves among his peers. Without those who are my equals, there is no freedom 
(...)” IP, p. 117.
For a primary description of the different concepts of freedom in Arendt’s political theory see Bonnie Honig: 
Political Theory and the displacement of Politics, New York, Cornell University Press, 1993.
The distinction between liberation and freedom is crucial for Arendt’s differentiation between Rebellion and 
Revolution, see Arendt, Hannah: On Revolution, New York, Penguin Books, 1968, Chapter 1, part II. For a 
new interpretation of political freedom in the sense of isonomia, see Balibar, Etienne: (De)constructing the 
Human as Human Institution. A Reflection on the Coherence of Hannah Arendt’s Practical Philosophy, in: 
Hannah Arendt: Verborgene Tradition – Unzeitgemäße Aktualität? Berlin, Akademie Verlag (forthcoming 
November 2007). For a beautiful interpretation of initium as a principle, see Birmingham, Peg: Hannah 
Arendt and Human Rights: The Predicament of Common Responsibility, Bloomington, Indiana University 
Press, 2006.
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